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Essay
The Trouble with Race
Is it good medical practice for 
physicians to “eyeball” a patient’s race 
when assessing their medical status 
or even to ask them to identify their 
race? This question was captured 
in a 2005 episode of “House M.D.,” 
Fox television’s medical drama. In 
the episode, a black patient with 
heart disease refuses a hospital 
physician’s prescription for what is 
clearly supposed to be BiDil, the drug 
approved by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration only for “self-
identiﬁ  ed” African-Americans [1]. Dr. 
House, on seeing the patient for follow-
up, insists on the same prescription. 
The patient again refuses, telling 
House, “I’m not buying into no racist 
drug, OK?” House, a white physician 
asks, “It’s racist because it helps black 
people more than white people? Well, 
on behalf of my peeps, let me say, 
thanks for dying on principle for us.” 
The patient replies, “Look. My heart’s 
red, your heart’s red. And it don’t 
make no sense to give us different 
drugs.”
Who is right here, House or his 
patient? And what does this episode 
tell us about the way race plays itself 
out in the physician–patient clinical 
encounter? What of clinical importance 
can be learned by making a quick 
racial assessment [2]? That an ACE 
(angiotensin-converting enzyme) 
inhibitor may not be effective? That 
screening for sickle cell anemia is 
a waste of time? Sorting patients by 
race may seem useful during a time-
constrained interview, but we argue 
that acting on rapid racial assessment 
can lead to missed diagnoses and 
inappropriate treatments.
Both historical evidence and 
contemporary genetic research suggest 
that “racial proﬁ  ling” in medicine 
can lead to serious medical errors. 
Assessing risk through race is more 
problematic than its typical depiction 
in the media and in scholarly literature 
[3]. Some argue that race can stand 
in for human genetic variance until 
individualized genetic medicine is 
fully developed. But such a position 
produces a critical paradox: the rates 
of morbidity and death from particular 
diseases are not uniformly distributed 
among socially deﬁ  ned racial and 
ethnic groups throughout the world 
[4–6]. In order to monitor the success 
of attempts to address these health 
inequalities, we need to keep health 
records based on racial and ethnic 
categories. This is a descriptive use 
of ethnoracial categories. Descriptive 
statistics derived from population 
surveys using racial deﬁ  nitions based on 
self-identity, however, are not biological 
or attributive categories appropriate for 
individual treatment [7]. How should 
physicians treat individuals who present 
with a perceived race but who may 
not bear the average characteristics 
of a studied population, even while 
collecting data based on perceived race 
or ethnicity and qualifying individuals 
for clinical research trials [8,9]? This 
problem is illustrated in Box 1, which 
describes an “on the ground” dilemma 
of administering a drug to individuals 
who do not ﬁ  t “standard” racial 
categories.
From Census Categories to 
Research Plans
Racial categories, with shifting 
meanings and culturally determined 
parameters, have always shaped 
medical practice and thinking, leading 
to vigorous debates about their use 
in epidemiology, public health, and 
medical research journals [10–17]. 
Throughout the 20th century, race 
had no standard deﬁ  nition in medical, 
epidemiological, or health services 
research [18–21]. In epidemiology, 
race vaguely referred to “persons who 
are relatively homogenous with respect 
to biologic inheritance” [18]. One 
survey of medical and epidemiological 
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dictionaries found that well into 
the 1980s deﬁ  nitions assumed that 
race reﬂ  ects ”underlying genetic 
homogeneity” rather than (or even in 
addition to) shared social experience 
[22]. Few of the studies making claims 
for race controlled for socioeconomic 
status or lifestyle variables.
The embedding of legal and social 
practices into the “common sense” 
meaning of race in medical research 
has been developing for centuries 
[23]. In the last several decades, 
poorly deﬁ  ned racial categories 
became reiﬁ  ed in biomedical research 
practices, in part because of the 
widespread use of US census categories 
[24]. Since 2001, NIH-funded 
researchers have been required to 
categorize study participants into the 
ﬁ  ve racial or ethnic categories deﬁ  ned 
by US Ofﬁ  ce of Management and 
Budget Directive No. 15 (American 
Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black 
or African American, Native Hawaiian 
or other Paciﬁ  c Islander, or White, 
and Hispanic/Latino or not Hispanic/
Latino) [25]. Thus, state-sanctioned 
but ill-deﬁ  ned categories of race have 
entered medical research and practice 
with the admirable intent of ensuring 
full racial and gender inclusion in 
clinical trials, but with unanticipated 
consequences for health outcomes 
[26].
Researchers rely on respondents’ 
self-identiﬁ  cation to collect data on 
race and ethnicity. Every research grant 
must report its study population in 
these terms, leading to their universal 
use in recruitment of research subjects. 
It thus becomes almost “natural” to use 
these same variables in the subsequent 
analysis and theoretical framing of 
the research, even though there is 
nothing particularly “natural” about the 
census categories. While the Ofﬁ  ce of 
Management and Budget’s categories 
dominate researchers’ analyses of 
human differences in disease, granting 
agencies’ regulations do little to 
clarify the extent to which racial 
and ethnic categories are intended 
to capture biological, cultural, or 
social dimensions of human diversity. 
The US Institute of Medicine, for 
example, holds that race should not 
be considered a biological reality, but 
rather “a construct of human variability 
based on perceived differences in 
biology, physical appearance, and 
behavior” [27]. And self-identities are 
given reality by the very categories we 
use to describe them [28,29].
Over the past several years, editors 
at leading medical and scientiﬁ  c 
journals have promoted a much 
needed dialogue among researchers 
and practitioners on the meaning 
of racial categories [30–40]. The 
current situation, however, remains 
confusing. As genetic ﬁ  ndings 
assume an increasingly prominent 
place in biomedical research, 
some have concluded that self-
identiﬁ  ed race/ethnicity, routinely 
collected in biomedical research 
studies, is a reasonable proxy for 
genetic homogeneity and may lead 
to important insights into health 
disparities [36,41–43]. Others, citing 
the genetic heterogeneity within self-
identiﬁ  ed groups [44–46], argue that 
race should not be used in genetic 
research [47–50]. A related perspective 
comes from those who argue that self-
identiﬁ  ed racial/ethnic categories 
may be practical for recruitment 
into studies, but should not be used 
in genetic analyses, given that more 
biologically precise measures of human 
genetic heterogeneity are available 
[17,51]. A recent study of geographic 
patterns of genetic variation, for 
example, found that “commonly used 
ethnic labels are both insufﬁ  cient 
and inaccurate representations of the 
inferred genetic clusters, and that 
drug-metabolizing proﬁ  les…differ 
signiﬁ  cantly among the clusters” [52].
Racial Categories Are Historical, 
Not Natural
Historically created racial categories 
often carry hidden meanings. Until 
2003 medical reports were cataloged 
in PubMed/MEDLINE and in the old 
Surgeon General’s Index Catalogue 
using 19th century racial categories 
such as Caucasoid, Monogolid, Negroid 
and Australoid [53]. Originally 
suggesting a scale of inferiority and 
superiority, today such groupings 
continue to connote notions of human 
hierarchy [27,54,55]. More importantly, 
PubMed’s newer categories, such as 
continental population group and 
ancestry group, merely overlay the 
older ones. Assuming that “African” 
origin can capture the complexity 
of migrations, artiﬁ  cial boundaries, 
and gene drift is scientiﬁ  cally 
unsupportable. So too is continued use 
of the concept of Caucasian (meaning 
from the central Asian countries 
surrounding the Caucus Mountains) 
to emphasize the similarities between 
disparate European groups rather 
than their population substructures or 
variations.
Racial deﬁ  nitions are historically and 
nationally speciﬁ  c. In her comparison 
of the history of racial categories in 
the US and Brazilian census from 
the late 18th century to the present, 
political scientist Melissa Nobles 
demonstrated that categories emerge 
and are deployed in different ways over 
time [56]. For example, during the 
mid-19th to the early 20th centuries, 
at the height of US anxiety about 
“miscegenation,” categories such as 
“mulatto” were vehicles for expressing 
and containing cultural anxiety about 
Box 1. Grace’s Dilemma
“What should I do with my Cape Verdean patient?” insists Grace, a third-year medical 
student. “The clinical protocol for hypertension requires me to identify his race but I 
don’t know how. Is he black or white? This man immigrated to the US at a young age. 
Is he now African American or should I consider his health needs from the perspective 
of his immigrant status?” The data on response to therapy seem to suggest that 
hypertension in blacks is somehow special, implying a separate genetic factor for 
blacks. But the enormous national differences in hypertension rates do not support this 
argument. African Americans suffer at rates 3.5 times those of Nigerians living in Africa, 
although African Americans experience only 0.75 the rates of Germans in Germany [79]. 
Which category matters more for Grace’s patient, country of origin or social status in the 
adopted nation?
Physicians everywhere face similar dilemmas. In clinical research projects or in the 
clinic, the assignment of race assumes an equivalence between census categories and 
genetics embodied by patients. The large Cape Verdean population in New England 
resists any simple categorization. The inhabitants are the descendents of Portuguese 
colonists, former slaves, explorers, and sailors of various nationalities. We suggest that, 
as with Cape Verdeans, census race cannot be assumed to reﬂ  ect a particular genetic 
make-up.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1425 September 2007  |  Volume 4  |  Issue 9  |  e271
racial purity. Bolstered by scientiﬁ  c 
ideas about race, data collected on the 
numbers of “mulattoes” were shaped by 
the desire to prove that “hybrids” would 
die out.
Another example of the creation 
and stabilization of racial categories 
occurred in the mid-20th century under 
the apartheid government in South 
Africa. Obsessed with racial purity, the 
nationalist government passed the ﬁ  rst 
Population Registration Act in 1950, 
which deﬁ  ned three groups—coloured, 
white, and native. According to the 
Act, a “‘coloured person’ means a 
person who is not a white person, or a 
native…‘native’ means a person who 
in fact is or is generally accepted as 
a member of any aboriginal race or 
tribe of Africa…‘white person’ means a 
person who in appearance obviously is, 
or who is generally accepted as a white 
person, but does not include a person 
who, although in appearance obviously 
a white person, is generally accepted as 
a coloured person” [57].
Over the next 30 years, however, 
numerous amendments attempted to 
harden those boundaries. By 1967, 
the deﬁ  nition of a white person was 
extended to include “his habits, 
education and speech and deportment 
and demeanor in general” [58]. 
Coloured became a residual category, 
comprised of any person who could not 
be neatly assigned to one of the two 
main racial groups. In this deﬁ  nition, 
as with racial categories in both the 
United States and Brazil, cultural, 
class, and biological aspects of human 
variability are confounded. Since the 
1994 dismantling of the apartheid state, 
racial or “population” categorization 
remains a subject of discomfort and 
public debate [59  –61]. Categories such 
as white/European, African, coloured, 
and Asian, nonetheless, are still widely 
used in health care settings and in 
studies of genetic predisposition to 
disease in South Africa. Differing local 
conventions in racial categorization 
present difﬁ  culties in transnational 
collaborative research and peer review 
in international publications. South 
African researchers, for example, may 
feel pressured to employ categories 
that make no sense in their context (A. 
Mall, personal communication).
In the early 20th century in the 
United States, shades of blackness were 
assumed to affect medical outcomes. 
This view generated supposed facts 
(the “fact” that blacks have lesser 
lung function, for example). Once 
a “fact” was linked to race rather 
than unhealthy living and working 
conditions, it resisted further challenge 
and became part of clinical judgments. 
For example, until the widespread 
use of penicillin, induced malarial 
fevers were used to treat neurosyphilis 
and differing malarial strains were 
deployed based on racial lines [62,63]. 
As one key 1932 textbook explained, 
black resistance to tertian malaria 
could be overcome “the lighter or 
closer to the Caucasian the particular 
Negro is” [64,65]. None of the texts 
explained how to measure color or 
why it was assumed that blacks, unlike 
whites, would be exposed to differing 
malarial strains, as if the mosquitoes 
respected residential segregation and 
could not cross a road or tracks. Even 
though retrospective data made it 
clear that syphilis was more likely to 
attack the cardiovascular rather than 
the neurological system in both blacks 
and whites, it was assumed that since 
African Americans did more labor 
than “brainwork,” they were more at 
risk for cardiovascular complications. 
Black cardiovascular deaths, in turn, 
were often labeled syphilitic in origin 
without the beneﬁ  t of autopsy, or 
misread when postmortems were done 
(S. M. Reverby, work in progress).
“Knowing” Race: From Research 
Plans to Individual Treatment
But the debate remains. Even given 
the history of the (mis)use of racial 
categories, are they nevertheless useful 
in the physician’s ofﬁ  ce? Does a quick 
administrative assessment of race help 
to diagnose a presenting ailment, or 
accurately assess future risk of illness? 
Environmental exposures, family 
histories, the stress of dealing with 
racism, access to and quality of care 
may be left unexamined if a physician 
simply diagnoses “race” [66]. In the 
United States a rule that assumes “one 
drop” of African blood deﬁ  nes an 
individual as African American [28] 
seems to prevail [67]. Presented with 
a black patient, in the face of medical 
uncertainty, rather than applying 
individual analysis the doctor can fall 
back upon general statements that 
derive from population studies, such 
as “You should get tested for glaucoma 
because you are African American and 
African Americans have a higher rate 
of glaucoma.”
A dark-skinned, curly-headed person 
who identiﬁ  es as African American 
may, indeed, have much in his or her 
history and upbringing to justify that 
identiﬁ  cation. But he or she may also 
have a white grandparent and several 
Cherokee ancestors. Thus, returning 
to the example of glaucoma, it is more 
important to know a patient’s family 
history than to assess his or her race. 
And collecting family history ought 
to mean not only compiling a list of 
which diseases family members have, 
but making some attempt to assess 
common (familial) habits such as diet 
and life experiences (e.g., ﬁ  rst- versus 
second-generation immigrants, living 
Box 2. The Future of Research on Race and Health Disparities
Race-related differences in health outcomes can be analyzed at the societal, 
individual, cellular, and subcellular levels. Studies focusing exclusively on one level often 
lose track of inter-level connections. Two research groups exemplify efforts to integrate 
research on health disparities at the level of cellular effects (e.g., on tumor production 
and growth), of societal level events (e.g., social support or toxin exposure), and 
individual life history events (e.g., reproductive history, stress, diet).
Epidemiologist Nancy Krieger [80  –82] applies the concept of embodiment to 
an understanding of how the social effects of racism and social inequality become 
symptoms [83] and illnesses that manifest as racially related health disparities (on 
embodiment, see also Fausto-Sterling, 2005 [84]). Krieger understands embodiment 
to be a multilevel phenomenon that serves as “an antonym to disembodied genes, 
minds and behaviors” [82]. Similarly, Masi and Olopade [85] propose a multilevel 
perspective on racial and ethnic disparities in breast cancer. Their model illustrates 
how the dynamics of societal and individual events over the life cycle can have speciﬁ  c 
cellular outcomes resulting in neoplasms with particular cellular characteristics. To the 
extent that societal and individual events vary systematically with social race, biological 
outcomes may result from social inequalities. The key to future understandings of health 
disparities lies in using frameworks such as those proposed by Krieger and Masi and 
Olopade to design and interpret research at every level, from the social to the cellular.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1426 September 2007  |  Volume 4  |  Issue 9  |  e271
conditions, or same versus widely varied 
work experience and geographical 
locations). Similarly, when the history 
of passing for white is ignored, those 
who identify themselves as “white” are 
assumed to have no ancestral “black 
blood.” Finally, immigration patterns 
constantly change. A “black” person 
walking into a Boston, Massachusetts 
clinic could easily be the child of a 
recent immigrant from Ethiopia or 
Brazil who has a genetic makeup as 
well as cultural and environmental 
exposures that differ signiﬁ  cantly from 
the descendents of 19th century US 
slaves from the western coast of Africa 
[68,69].
Once race is presumed, the ways in 
which multiple genetic inheritances 
interact with the environment within 
that individual seem to disappear (see 
Box 2). Clinical clues can become 
invisible. Even with the relatively 
few diseases “known” to have a 1:1 
relationship between a single mutant 
allele and a disease phenotype, reliance 
on a general idea of race can lead to 
misdiagnosis. In a different American 
television series, ER, a “white” 
patient with sickle cell anemia was 
misdiagnosed because the condition 
is known as a “black” illness. Sickle 
cell anemia (homozygous HbSS) 
results from a genetic alteration 
affecting the hemoglobin protein. Its 
high prevalence in some populations 
bespeaks their historical burden 
of falciparum malaria. The simple 
gene change responsible for sickle 
hemoglobin spans the continent of 
Africa and beyond. Its prevalence in 
the sub-Saharan region ranges between 
10% to 40% [70]. Within even smaller 
geographical areas this diversity is also 
apparent. In the tiny West African 
country of The Gambia, the Mandinka 
people have an extremely low 
incidence at 4%, the Wolof are nearly 
on par with black Americans at 14%, 
and the more socially endogenous 
Fula hover just below 30% [71]. 
Nonetheless, in a clinical encounter in 
North America, where census category 
deﬁ  nitions of race prevail, these groups 
and their descendents would, most 
likely, occupy the category “Black or 
African American.” Moreover, some 
of the highest rates in the world are 
found in India, with rates of 33% and 
35% in the Pardhan and Oktar people, 
respectively [72]. Sickle cell disease is 
thus not “race-bound.”
So what is the practicing physician to 
do? In the case of sickle cell disease, it 
would be best to work from symptoms 
rather than racial assumptions, and 
to enquire about geographic ancestry 
since sickle cell is more prevalent in 
populations from the Mediterranean 
region, sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
Indian subcontinent [70].
Is Cultural Competency the 
Answer?
Clinicians will make better educated 
patient evaluations if they familiarize 
themselves with the history of the 
particular communities they serve. For 
the clinical encounter, the cultural 
competency paradigm is sometimes 
offered as a tool for improving quality 
of care. Cultural competency advocates 
have spurred curricular reform so 
that clinicians in training learn to be 
attentive to cross-cultural issues. A 
cultural competency paradigm has 
recently been suggested as a powerful 
tool in the arsenal to combat the 
prevalence of racial and ethnic health 
disparities [73]. However, when not 
thoughtfully executed, the cultural 
competency paradigm can abet the 
simplistic thinking on race it seeks 
to address. On the one hand, this 
perspective brings greater attention 
to the attitudes and behaviors that 
patients may bring to the clinical 
encounter. On the other hand such 
cultural stereotyping could produce 
poor health outcomes if the clinician is 
more attentive to what he or she thinks 
they know about this “type” of patient 
than to the individual before them 
[74].
Race in the Era of Individually 
Tailored Treatment
Medical researchers want tools that 
will allow physicians to understand 
how the individual biosocial system 
represented by a patient standing 
before them has either produced 
symptoms, or has a certain future 
likelihood of doing so. Whether or 
not the recent announcement of a $10 
million cash award for the ﬁ  rst team 
to sequence 100 genomes in 10 days 
will get us closer to individual genomic 
medicine remains to be seen [75]. 
But in the meantime, race remains 
a social characteristic of populations 
and it is inappropriate to use it as a 
central diagnostic tool for an individual 
patient.
The case of BiDil, the drug the 
ﬁ  ctional Dr. House prescribed to his 
skeptical African American patient, 
stands as a cautionary tale [76]. 
Depending on how the age-speciﬁ  c 
morbidity data on heart disease are 
read, the case for the urgency of 
additional treatments for African 
Americans can be made. Those 
advocating for BiDil argued that the 
dangers of the disease are so grave 
that there was a moral necessity for a 
race-speciﬁ  c drug, while others found 
the statistical case for differential 
morbidity to be unconvincing [77]. By 
primarily relying on a clinical trial that 
only included black men and women, 
claims were made that the drug worked 
for those who deﬁ  ned themselves as 
African American. Further, earlier 
studies that purported to show that 
ACE inhibitors—another medication 
for heart failure and an alternative 
to the active therapies in BiDil—did 
not work as well on blacks failed to 
acknowledge that this was not true 
for all black people in the study [51]. 
Other researchers who work on drug 
metabolizing enzymes have argued 
bluntly that “skin pigment is a lousy 
surrogate for drug-metabolism status or 
most any aspect of human physiology 
” [51].
BiDil’s real impact may therefore 
be less on actual patient care (since 
physicians are being encouraged to 
use the drug “off-label” for anyone 
they please) and more on the fact that 
the US government gave its stamp of 
approval for what bioethicist Sandra 
Soo-Jin Lee labels “racial proﬁ  ling 
in biomedicine” [78]. Although the 
drug may reify race, this may not be a 
useful guide to determine who needs 
it. In the end Dr. House may be right 
about how medicine is practiced 
and how drugs are marketed, but his 
patient understands more about the 
underlying biology.
Thoughts for the 10-Minute 
Clinical Encounter
Improved medical training about race 
can sharpen diagnostic skills. Cultural 
competency instruction should be 
modiﬁ  ed to include information on 
the history of racial categories, current 
controversies about their biological 
signiﬁ  cance, and the limits of their 
utility. A teaching unit on race would 
also contrast the differences between 
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its meaning when applied to the 
lives of individuals. In this context it 
would be appropriate to teach about 
geographical variations in speciﬁ  c 
allele frequencies for genes linked to 
particular disease processes, as well as 
the cultural practices, historical trends, 
and environmental conditions that 
favor their prevalence or not.
Physicians face huge demands for 
time efﬁ  ciency and product output, 
often being called upon to process 
as many as six patients per hour. No 
wonder that rapid racial assessment is 
an attractive means to ﬁ  gure out what 
to do with a presenting patient. But we 
argue that even if there are short cuts 
for the medical interview, race is not 
a good one. There is, in the end (in 
addition to noting physical symptoms), 
no substitute for an inquiry into family 
history, an assessment of current 
circumstances, and knowledge about 
the biological and cultural histories 
of speciﬁ  c populations serviced by a 
particular treatment center.
What Is To Be Done?
In the long run, the problem of 
whether or how to use race as a 
diagnostic aid and research category 
requires an international consensus 
meeting with representatives from all 
the biomedical ﬁ  elds. Such a meeting 
should be organized by the US National 
Institutes of Health, the World Health 
Organization, and other international 
health institutes. In the short run, the 
National Institutes of Health needs 
to re-examine its race-based research 
rules, weighing the balance between 
attempting to include minority 
populations in our health care system, 
on the one hand, without forcing us 
into a misconstrual of race as biology 
on the other. Medical courses also 
need to improve the teaching of the 
complexities of using race in the clinic. 
The overall goal of such an effort would 
be to make clear that “For meaningful 
statements to be made about health 
disparities, careful consideration must 
be given to the way in which race 
and ethnicity are conceptualized, the 
choice of deﬁ  nition categories, and the 
way in which individuals are assigned 
to categories” [66]. Anthropologist 
Michael Montoya’s distinction between 
using ethnoracial categories in a 
descriptive mode, to document progress 
in the health status of populations, but 
not using basically social categories to 
produce biological attribution of causes 
will be an essential part of this effort 
[7]. In the end we have to be able to 
answer the patient’s question—if all 
hearts are red then why do we need 
different drugs for different individuals 
based on race? To provide the best 
health care we must be able to say why 
and when race matters and why and 
when it doesn’t.  
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